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It is commonplace today to hear climate change identified as the single most important 
challenge facing humanity. Consider the headlines from COP24, the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference held in Poland in December 2018. U.N. Secretary-General 
António Guterres opened the proceedings by calling climate change “the most important 
issue we face” (PBS 2018). The Secretary-General’s remarks paraphrase the opening line 
of  the U.N.’s climate change web page, which announces that “[c]limate Change is the 
defining issue of  our time and we are at a defining moment” (United Nations n.d.). Such 
statements about the singular significance of  climate change—the most important, the 
defining issue—are often followed by proclamations about what hangs in the balance, and 
this was the case at COP24. There, the celebrated British naturalist Sir David Attenborough 
warned that “collapse of  our civilizations and the extinction of  much of  the natural world 
is on the horizons,” amounting to, in his words, “disaster of  global scale, our greatest threat 
in thousands of  years” (Jordans and Scislowska 2018).
 As common as this rhetoric is, and despite the important strategic role that it plays 
in the context of  international climate negotiations, it leaves me profoundly uneasy. I say 
“uneasy,” rather than “skeptical,” because I am neither a skeptic about anthropogenic 
climate disruption nor about the scientific evidence and predictions of  terrible times to 
come. What leaves me uneasy is something else, a matter of  how the present is interpreted 
when climate collapse is identified as the most important issue we face, threatening the 
collapse of  civilization as such. This suggests, first, that civilization has been going along just 
fine and would continue to do so if  not interrupted by something more or less external to 
it, something not essential to it or to its continuation. We are called to marshal all available 
resources as quickly as possible to address the single greatest challenge the world has ever 
faced, in the hopes that we can preserve it in its present form, sustain it, into the future 
as far as possible. I am uneasy with this assessment of  our present state of  affairs and this 
emergency prioritization of  its continuation as the decisive issue of  our time.
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 Second, I am uneasy about the “we” who here claim to speak for humanity, for “our 
civilizations.” How much of  humanity does this “we” include? Would the ten percent of  
the world’s population living in extreme poverty today, or the nearly half  of  the world’s 
population that struggles to meet basic needs, agree that climate collapse is the most 
important issue “we” face? (World Bank 2018). Would those whose lives, livelihoods, and 
communities have been violated by extractive industries, by settler colonialism, by forced 
migration, by environmental injustices, by police violence, by anti-Black racism, by the 
intersections of  violence and oppression that have made and continue to make “our” 
civilization possible—would they agree that climate change is “the defining issue of  our 
time” or that every available resource should be mobilized to maintain the world in its 
present form? This is far from obvious to me.
 To be clear, I do not believe that anyone will be better off as a consequence of  climate 
disruption. It is well-established that the most vulnerable—the poor, women, children, the 
elderly, communities of  color, the displaced, the incarcerated—will suffer the most. And 
even the wealthiest and most privileged will be unable to avoid its effects entirely.1 In this 
sense, it could be considered a common danger, a danger shared by everyone. Some see in 
this a reason for political optimism. Traditionally, communities of  color have been “our” 
environmental sacrifice zones, the dumping grounds for extractive and polluting industries, 
incinerators, toxic waste, and so on, so that the costs of  “civilization” could remain out of  
sight and out of  mind for those who accrue its benefits. But climate change is happening 
to everyone, and the violence of  the extractive industries that feed it is already impacting 
educated, wealthy, white communities, so that new coalitions have become possible.2 Those 
with political and economic clout, or at least some of  them, are now motivated to address 
the root causes of  climate change since they can no longer avoid its effects. But this is 
precisely why the “we” rings hollow when it declares climate change the decisive issue for 
everyone, rather than for those who are most invested in the continuation of  the world as it 
is.
 I have started here intentionally with my feelings of  uneasiness, rather than with any 
argument per se, because I do not dismiss the genuine hardships to come. As of  December 
2020, the last seven years have been the hottest years since we began keeping records. Real 
human lives have been lost as a result, and this is still the beginning. And so it is difficult 
to bring the rhetoric of  urgency surrounding climate destabilization into critical focus. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely this rhetoric of  urgency that is my topic here.
 We begin, then, by asking whether this prioritization of  climate destabilization as the 
defining threat of  recorded human history is justified. In his book, Stolen Future, Broken 
Present, David Collings (2014) suggests that climate disruption deserves this status because 
it fundamentally alters our relationship to the future as such. As he describes in a chapter 
titled, “The Ruins to Come,” climate predictions portray our present culture and lives, 
1 See Collings (2014), especially chapter 1.
2 This is roughly Naomi Klein’s (2014) argument in This Changes Everything.
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the world of  today, as future ruins. Looking around us right now, we should see this world 
shadowed by the ruin it is on the verge of  becoming. Still, this is not enough to make 
climate collapse the definitive danger of  human history: civilizations have ended before, 
and we have all admired the picturesque ruins that they have left behind. And certainly, 
at various points, those whose civilizations were in decline had premonitions of  what was 
coming and could also picture their own worlds as future ruins. But there is more. The 
future ruins of  climate change are not confined to a few buildings, or a city, or a landscape. 
This time, the future ruins encompass the earth as a whole (105). Before, we might have said 
that, while civilizations rise and fall, nature endures. This is no longer true. Before, those 
whose cultures were collapsing might still have had hope in a different future for themselves 
or their children, the possibility to rebuild elsewhere. But this time, survivors will witness the 
definitive eclipse of  humanity’s future, with no guarantees of  any new beginning (107). As 
Collings (2014) concludes:
Our own mortality fades in comparison to something altogether 
more harrowing—the possible mortality of  our societies, the natural 
systems we know, and to some extent the biosphere itself. In our 
world, the temporal coherence of  a future into which our individual 
lives vanish—the coherence, in short, of  mortality itself—is falling 
into decay. (112)
At stake in climate disruption, then, is not merely the ruin of  a world, that of  the civilizations 
of  today, but of  the very basis for the world and even for time itself  as we know it.
 Collings is not alone to see the ruins of  the future in the figure of  climate disruption. 
For Andrew Benjamin (2017), in an essay titled “The World in Ruins,” it is the task of  
philosophy to think the end of  the world starting from a double sense of  catastrophe. A 
catastrophe in the first and transformative sense would decouple the existing link between 
climate change and injustice, thereby bringing about the creation of  a new world (102-03). 
But such a transformative catastrophe may no longer be a possibility for us today. In that 
case, we are left only with the second sense of  catastrophe, catastrophic climate change, 
without transformation or continuity. As Benjamin writes, “[t]he end to be thought is the 
end of  the world as such, that is, a world that is now present without always already bearing 
within it the inscription, image, or possibility of  another beginning” (103). It is this “ending 
without a beginning . . . an ending that is not itself  a preparation for a beginning,” whose 
insistence demands thought (104, 109).
 Framing Benjamin’s inquiry is the conviction that philosophy can no longer remain 
apathetic to its own predicament, that it is no longer possible to refuse, on philosophical 
grounds, the relation between philosophy and the now in which it takes a stand (101-02). By 
“the now,” italicized to distinguish it from our simple sense of  now, he intends “a thinking 
of  the present as that which generates the philosophical task” (118 n. 1). The insistent now 
of  such a philosophical task would be entirely distinct from either the self-evident now of  
empiricism or the inevitable now of  naturalism. With this redefinition of  philosophy’s task, 
Benjamin takes us a long way toward articulating an essential aim of  critical phenomenology, 
which, in taking a stand, would “allow the question of  its own stand in relation to the now 
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to delimit a specific philosophical project.” Benjamin’s (2017) own contention here is that 
“what determines or defines the now is the ineliminable presence of  catastrophic climate 
change, a change that is leaving the world in ruins” (102). In short, where philosophy stands 
now can only be thought in relation to this predicament, so that, as he succinctly puts it, 
“what has to be thought is the end of  the world” (101).
 Here I take up this task of  thinking the now in its relation to the future, or to the end 
of  the future. But I do so by asking after the image of  time that this orientation toward 
the end implies or unfolds. More precisely, my starting point will be popular narratives of  
climate change, and environmentalism more generally, with respect to their apocalyptic 
structure. Apocalyptic fantasies weave through contemporary culture and intertwine 
themselves with our scientific predictions and our efforts to manage the future. I propose 
that these apocalyptic fantasies enact a temporal narrative that first became possible with 
our discovery of  “deep” geological timescales, scales of  time so vast that they explode all 
efforts to integrate them with the time of  human life. The emergence of  secular apocalyptic 
narratives goes hand-in-hand with this expansion of  the horizons of  time, so that time 
encompasses pasts that precede us as well as futures that survive us. In short, a radical 
end of  the world first becomes thinkable through a new image of  time, a new temporal 
sublime, that underlies apocalypticism in its recent forms, including speculative fictions, 
nuclear fears, environmental disaster, and climate disruption. 
 On this basis, I explore a series of  questions posed by such apocalyptic narratives: 
Does this image of  time exhaust our possibilities for relating to the sublime dimensions of  
the deep past and far future? Does it skew our relation to the present, to the now? What 
investments or fears are expressed through this apocalyptic image, and what does it reveal 
about our responsiveness to and responsibility for the past, present, and future? Does justice 
demand of  us a different image of  time, and what form might this take?
 I proceed first by briefly summarizing the transformation of  temporal horizons opened 
by geological scales of  time and past extinctions as a reconfiguration of  the temporal 
sublime. I turn then to the role of  apocalyptic narratives in climate change rhetoric and 
the image of  time that frames these narratives. Here, I am especially interested in the 
role that crisis plays as the passage from the corrupt present to a purified future, marked 
by the transfiguration of  time in the crucible of  Judgment Day. On this basis, I consider 
some of  the investments and motivations underlying the tragic and comic modes of  time 
that drive climate narratives. I argue that these instantiate what Jean-Luc Nancy has 
called “catastrophic equivalence,” leveling time into homogenous and substitutable units 
to facilitate the predictability and manageability of  the future. Rather than owning our 
temporal responsibilities, then, apocalyptic narratives in fact seek to liquidate our obligations 
to the past, obscure the singularity of  the present, and exert absolute control over the future. 
A just image of  time faces two demands: responsiveness to the singularity of  the present, 
and to the entanglement of  this present in the plexities of  past and future. I conclude with 
two explorations of  this figure of  temporal justice: Kyle Powys Whyte’s (2018) proposal of  
“spiraling time” as a living dialogue with our ancestors and descendants, and artist Roni 
Horn’s installation, Library of  Water, in Stykkishólmur, Iceland.
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THE TEMPORAL SUBLIME 
I begin with some historical context for our shifting horizons of  time, which I read through 
the lens of  the temporal sublime. The fact that long expanses of  time confront the human 
mind with a sublime dimension was recognized by both David Hume and Immanuel Kant, 
although neither devotes much attention to this experience.3 Kant’s entire treatment of  
this topic in his pre-critical Observations on the Feeling of  the Beautiful and the Sublime [1764], for 
instance, appears in the following few lines:
A long duration is sublime. If  it is of  time past, it is noble; if  it is projected forth into 
an unforeseeable future, then there is something terrifying in it. An edifice from the 
most distant antiquity is worthy of  honor. Haller’s description of  the future eternity 
inspires a mild horror, and of  the past, a transfixed admiration. (2007, 26)
In the later terms of  the Critique of  Judgment [1790], this suggests that the past confronts 
us with an experience of  the mathematical sublime, and indeed Kant refers there to past 
time as an infinite magnitude (1987, 111), although this later text offers no further mention 
of  time’s sublime character. The unforeseeable future, on the other hand, although never 
mentioned in the Critique of  Judgment, would be a species of  the dynamically sublime, arousing 
fear in us in a way that is somehow parallel to the elemental examples that Kant favors: 
threatening rocks, thunderclouds, volcanoes, hurricanes, and the like (120).4 The reference 
here to Albrecht von Haller’s (2002) “Uncompleted Poem on Eternity” suggests that, for 
Kant, the future is not to be thought as an infinite magnitude since it is progressing towards 
its end. And, indeed, he returns to Haller in his 1794 text, “The End of  All Things”—a 
rebuke of  Prussian millenarian politics—where what is at stake is not a future proceeding 
to infinity but precisely eternity as the horrifying abyss that opens beyond the edge of  time, 
beyond the Judgment Day that brings the sensible world to its conclusion. Eternity beyond 
time is unthinkable, and its “frighteningly sublime” character is due in part to its obscurity; 
yet, according to Kant, “in the end it must also be woven in a wondrous way into universal 
human reason, because it is encountered among all reasoning peoples at all times, clothed 
in one way or another” (1996, 221; emphasis in original). The caution of  Kant’s tale is 
to remember that the religious and cultural imagery with which we clothe this notion of  
eternity must be understood according to the moral order and not in literal or physical 
terms. 
3 Hume (2007, 274-80); Kant (2007); Brady (2013) traces some of  the early history of  the temporal 
sublime.
4 Such elemental examples of  the dynamically sublime are also among the omens for Judgment Day 
(Kant 1996, 225).
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 For both Hume and Kant, the sublime past is revealed only through cultural antiquities, 
never through natural or elemental phenomena.5 But in the thirty years that separate these 
sparse references to the temporal sublime in Kant, developments in what would come to 
be known as geological science were setting the stage for a dramatic reorientation in our 
relationship with long durations of  time. James Hutton’s 1788 Theory of  the Earth famously 
proposed a concept of  geological time with “no vestige of  a beginning—no prospect of  
an end” (304), and through the writings of  his friend and popularizer, John Playfair, this 
newly opened horizon of  what would come to be known as “deep” time was characterized 
from the outset in sublime terms.6 This discovery of  the deep past simultaneously opens 
the horizons of  the far future and our contemporary cultural obsession with apocalypse. 
Georges Cuvier’s evidence for prehistoric extinctions laid the groundwork for Mary 
Shelley’s exploration of  future human extinction in her 1826 novel, The Last Man, generally 
recognized as the first secular apocalyptic novel. The genre of  apocalyptic speculative 
fiction inaugurated by Shelley first gained popularity by imagining our demise from natural 
causes, but the First World War shifted our fantasies toward the prospect of  self-annihilation 
by weapons of  mass destruction. And Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, written during the lead 
up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, played a key role in transferring our nuclear anxieties to the 
emerging threat of  ecological collapse. 
 Contemporary climate apocalypticism is therefore simply the latest phase in our cultural 
efforts to manage the sublime dimensions of  our uncertain future. Just as the threat of  total 
nuclear war—what Jacques Derrida in 1984 termed the “phantasm of  a remainderless 
destruction” (2007, 396)—framed human reality during the Cold War period, so the 
phantasm of  future climate collapse constructs our present today. Ongoing debates over 
whether to name our contemporary geological period the “Anthropocene” are symptomatic 
of  this transfigured temporal perspective, which offers a vantage from which humanity can 
hold itself  responsible—for the first time—for our long-term ecological transformations 
of  the globe, while raising—also for the first time—the question of  our ethical obligations 
toward an unimaginably distant future. At stake, then, in environmentalism’s adoption of  
apocalyptic narratives is an underlying image of  time, one that becomes especially salient 
in climate change narratives. Let us consider, first, the reliance of  climate discourse on 
apocalyptic narratives and then draw out the image of  time by which these are framed.
5 In Critique of  Judgment, Kant (1987) points out that the shape of  land and sea as encountered today is 
the result of  chaotic upheavals and disturbances in ancient times, recorded in the “memorials of  mighty 
devastations” studied by the “archeology of  nature” (or “theory of  the earth”). But Kant does not discuss 
these “memorials” as having a sublime character due to their antiquity, and they do not pre-date “man”; 
the lack of  human fossil remains is explained, for Kant, by the fact that “his understanding was able to 
rescue him (for the most part, at least) from those devastations” (316).
6 See, in particular, Playfair’s (1822( description of  his 1788 trip with Hutton to Siccar Point (80-81).
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CLIMATE COLLAPSE AS JUDGMENT DAY
During the final week of  the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference, four 
Greenpeace activists paraded on horseback through the streets of  Copenhagen dressed 
in costumes representing famine, pestilence, war, and death. Invoking the four horsemen 
of  the apocalypse from the biblical Book of  Revelations, their intent was to dramatize the 
stakes of  climate change negotiations. In a press release from Greenpeace International, 
Sini Harkka of  Greenpeace Nordic explained that “[t]he spectre of  the four horseman is 
looming over these climate negotiations . . . Yet world leaders are still failing to grasp the 
urgency of  the crisis” (Greenpeace International 2009). Despite the drama of  this example, 
such uses of  apocalyptic rhetoric to influence public opinion and political will concerning 
climate change no longer surprise anyone, and there has been considerable debate among 
scholars and activists about whether this rhetoric actually achieves its desired effect. 
These debates tend to start from an understanding of  “apocalypse” as straightforwardly 
synonymous with catastrophe, with the end of  the world “as we know it,” whether that 
means the end of  “our” current standard of  living, or the end of  human civilization in any 
historically recognizable form, or the literal extinction of  the human species, and so on. 
And when apocalypse is read as synonymous with catastrophe, the rhetorical deployment 
of  the narrative is understood to be in the service of  galvanizing individual action and 
political will through fear and horror at the likely consequences of  inaction. This rhetorical 
strategy can then be criticized as ineffectual or counter-productive fear-mongering along 
the lines familiar from Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger (2007).
 Now, my interest here is not with the psychological or political efficacy of  apocalyptic 
rhetoric, but with the temporality that it enacts. To that end, I want to call attention to 
the trend, noted by Stefan Skrimshire (2014), of  stripping references to apocalypse of  
their “theological nuances” in favor of  their “sensationalist elements,” and particularly of  
treating such discourses as reducible to fear of  the future. What is obscured here, Skrimshire 
reminds us, is precisely the “complex dramatic structure” of  the religious apocalyptic 
narrative, which includes “the creation of  tension between the corruption that is endured 
in the present age and the hope in the new age that is yet to come” (237). The temporal, 
eschatological element of  apocalyptic thinking is precisely to be found in this productive 
tension, which revolves around an explicit or implicit “Judgment Day.”
 One of  the defining features of  apocalyptic temporality is said to be its linear directionality, 
either guided by divine providence or driven by natural forces, toward a catastrophic end-
point, a “judgment day,” beyond which all individual human judgment is irrelevant (Foust 
and Murphy 2009, 154). Alongside the spectacular destruction of  the current world, this 
narrative structure “prophecies (directly or implicitly) a new world order,” and Judgment 
Day marks the passage into this new age, which is therefore also a new time (154, citing 
Brummett 1984). To clarify the role of  this moment of  crisis as a temporal hinge, as the 
turning point between “our” time and a time to come, we draw on the work of  political 
theorist Ben Jones (2017), who examines the appeal of  Christian apocalyptic thinking for 
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secular political theorists. Jones focuses on the strand of  Christian thinking that he terms 
“cataclysmic apocalyptic thought,” exemplified by the Book of  Revelation among other 
texts, that “identifies crisis as the path to the ideal society” (2). On this view, crisis is not to be 
avoided but rather welcomed since it is the only path that can wipe away the current state 
of  corruption and replace it with lasting utopia (3). The truly apocalyptic crisis, then, is the 
final crisis, the one that installs us in a time beyond all crises. And this leavens our everyday 
struggles, here and now, with transcendent significance, insofar as they are moments of  
the larger progression toward final purification; we may be losing the local struggle, but 
we are still on the winning side of  the cosmic battle.7 My suggestion is that our cultural 
fascination with fictional apocalyptic narratives is less a manifestation of  our desire for our 
own destruction than our yearning for this transcendent significance; we are ready, in our 
heart of  hearts, to wipe the world away and start again, even at the risk that we might be 
wiped away with it. In the Christian version of  this narrative, of  course, the crisis and its 
aftermath unfold under the guidance of  divine providence, and we need only have faith 
in this. Secular versions proceed without this safety net or try, like Marxism, to replace it 
by other mechanisms. In any case, the way that we live the apocalyptic narrative today is 
through our deep pleasure at the prospect of  leaping into an unimaginable world and a new 
age without any guarantees of  survival—and, importantly, without any unpaid debts to the 
past.
 The radicality of  this image of  time follows from the unique moment of  judgment, 
which is precisely a singular break where time folds, dehiscing into the old that is washed 
away and the ideal future to come. This returns us to Kant’s (1996) late essay, “The End 
of  All Things,” where he calls attention to the strange temporality of  Judgment Day as the 
hinge between time and eternity, which both horrifies and attracts us with the full force 
of  the sublime. For Kant this is a transition between the happening of  events under the 
conditions of  time, on the one hand, and an eternity in which nothing can come to pass, 
on the other, a situation that cannot be rationally comprehended but is to be understood 
according to the moral order of  ends. Judgment Day is always a selection, a differentiation 
of  the corrupt from the pure, that represents an absolute break with the past—toward 
which no further debts are owed—and entrance into a finality beyond which no further 
beginning, no future as such, is possible. What contemporary apocalyptic thinking retains 
from this structure is the linear sorting of  time into a corrupt present and an ideal beyond, 
with the moment of  judgment as their transition. As with Kant, it is the eternal or the 
utopian moment that remains sublime, unthinkable—and transcendent.
7 On this point, see Jones (2017, 5) and Skrimshire (2014, 239).
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APOCALYPTIC EQUIVALENCE AND TEMPORAL LIABILITY
The suggestion I have been developing here is that our contemporary apocalypticism 
remains fundamentally eschatological, that it embraces crisis as a Judgment Day that marks 
the hinge between our corrupt present world and a new dawn, even or especially when this 
eschatological frame is not consciously or explicitly theological. It is this basic narrative 
that has underwritten environmentalism since at least Silent Spring, despite the modifications 
that it has undergone in the light of  new technologies and shifting political contexts.8 This 
narrative justifies itself  in terms of  our ethical obligations toward the future, and yet it 
assumes a figure of  time that conceals our ethical obligations—not only toward the future, 
but also toward the past and present. 
 To see why this is so, we must first recognize that the apocalyptic image of  time 
participates in what Jean-Luc Nancy (2015) has termed the “equivalence of  catastrophes.” 
Nancy describes our global ecotechnical situation as an ever-expanding entanglement of  
interdependencies between innumerable systems—political, military, industrial, financial, 
logical, natural, and so on. This interdependence depends on the translatability of  units 
across all of  these systems, which requires that the units have a common denominator, a 
common measure of  equivalence. This is most obvious in the equivalence of  bits and bytes, 
such as when a picture taken on your phone is stamped with GIS location data, sent by wifi 
to the cloud, distributed across social media platforms, viewed around the world, backed up 
on Google’s hard drives, added to law enforcement facial recognition databases, and so on. 
The interdependence of  all systems means that our catastrophes, such as the 2011 disaster 
at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant discussed by Nancy, are uncontainable in 
their effects. But the deeper catastrophe, as Nancy argues, is the general equivalence that 
makes the interdependence of  systems possible in the first place, namely, the leveling of  
all measures into a common denominator that facilitates translation across domains. This 
general equivalence inspires a proliferation of  means and ends without orientation toward 
any final end or ultimate goal other than their own continued expansion and proliferation. 
It is this loss of  any ultimate sense or direction that Nancy has called the “end of  the world” 
(1997, 4-5). Our constant awareness of  the possibility of  our own self-destruction stands in 
place of  any final end as the secret fulfillment of  the leveling of  time into a homogenous 
continuum (2015, 17-20). The operations of  this catastrophe of  equivalence can be traced 
in those approaches to sustainability that extrapolate from deep-past trends to predict and 
manage far-future scenarios, thereby tacitly assuming that our obligation toward the future 
is to “sustain” the world in a state that resembles as closely as possible our present.
 Nancy points out that the absence of  any end or goal for our ecotechnical 
interdependencies apart from their own self-perpetuation traps us in a cycle of  planning 
and management of  the future in general, and the extrapolation of  the past to calculate 
8 See Killingsworth and Palmer (1996); Buell (2010).
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the future demonstrates the sway of  this general equivalence in our understanding of  
time, since each chronological present moment is substitutable and exchangeable for every 
other. Now, this catastrophic leveling of  time is precisely a means of  repressing the sublime 
dimensions of  the future through calculative management. In other words, by leveling time 
into homogenous and exchangeable units, we defang the future of  its unpredictability; we 
contain it as an infinitely repeatable present. Thus managed, the threat of  our extinction 
or of  the end of  the world can be indefinitely deferred. On this approach, the threat of  the 
end of  the world (and the end of  time) justifies absolute management of  the world through 
the homogenization of  time. Judgment Day, as the only decisive interruption of  the linear 
and calculable equivalence of  “nows,” always looms on the horizon as the absolute danger 
demanding further ecotechnical interdependency, further integration of  substitutable 
systems. This firm grip on managing the future inevitably see-saws into resignation, into the 
realization that Judgment Day cannot be indefinitely deferred. But this resignation satisfies 
another deep desire, namely the complete liquidation of  the past, a wiping clean of  the 
slate of  past debts and obligations. As a repression of  the temporal sublime, Judgment 
Day is both the specter that drives the proliferation of  catastrophic equivalence and its 
consequence.
 To make this diagnosis more concrete, we can turn to Potawatomi scholar Kyle Powys 
Whyte’s (2018) critique of  settler environmental rhetoric surrounding the Anthropocene 
and apocalypticism more generally. Whyte notes that settler apocalyptic narratives, 
proposed as the effort of  stopping “a dreaded future movement from stability to crisis,” 
erase the legacies of  colonial violence that have been experienced by many Indigenous 
people as repeated and ongoing apocalypses (227). As Anishinaabe scholar Lawrence 
Gross (2014) writes, “Native Americans have seen the ends of  their respective worlds. . . . 
Indians survived the apocalypse” (233). Drawing on the work of  Tahltan scholar Candis 
Callison, Whyte notes that “the hardships many nonIndigenous people dread most of  the 
climate crisis are ones that Indigenous people have endured already due to different forms 
of  colonialism: ecosystem collapse, species loss, economic crash, drastic relocation, and 
cultural disintegration” (226). Furthermore, by seeking to liquidate the past and the present 
in a new beginning, the settler apocalyptic narrative imagines for itself  an innocent future, 
one in which all obligations and debts for past and present colonial violence are assumed 
to be discharged. While Whyte’s discussion here concerns the experience of  Indigenous 
Americans specifically, his critique of  settler colonialism can easily be extended to the 
historically linked legacy of  enslavement. Historian Gerald Horne (2018) writes that “[w]
hat is euphemistically referred to as ‘modernity’ is marked with the indelible stain of  what 
might be termed the Three Horsemen of  the Apocalypse: Slavery, White Supremacy, and 
Capitalism” (9). Such considerations trouble the ubiquitous narratives that, from some 
quarters, announce climate change as the apocalypse to come while turning a blind eye to 
the past and continuing violence that has made the present world a possibility. How might 
different narratives, guided by a different image of  time, do justice to these experiences?
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THE DEEP TEMPORAL SUBLIME AND THE SINGULAR PRESENT
Breaking with the apocalyptic image of  time requires, first, that we come to terms with 
the plexity of  deep time, and second, that we rediscover the singularity of  the unique and 
non-substitutable present. On the first point, the explosion of  our temporal horizons far 
beyond the limits of  human history considered by Hume or Kant, and the parallel opening 
of  a deep temporal future that continues beyond human extinction, confront us with the 
fact that our personal and historical temporalities are entangled and shot through with 
anachronistic and incompossible durations—those of  our evolutionary history, for example, 
and, further still, of  our own elemental materiality. Michel Serres (2018), explaining what he 
calls the Grand Narrative, the topologically folded multiplex of  temporal scales, writes the 
following: “The senses open the body on to the world, it is said; no, they make us descend 
into an immemorial duration, towards long lost environments” (12). The experience of  
the deep temporal sublime is characterized precisely by its incommensurability with the 
narrative structures of  personal and cultural history, by the vertigo of  losing all common 
markers and measures. This testifies to our entanglement in a past that was never our own 
possibility, never our own memory—an impossible and immemorial past. Indeed, the very 
“depth” of  geological time is the bottomless free-fall into which it throws all markers and 
touchstones by which we orient ourselves within the temporal horizons of  our world. The 
schema of  general equivalence is our unsuccessful attempt to repress this abyssal vertigo. 
 If  we give up the effort to regiment time within general equivalence, then we open 
ourselves to our ongoing involvement, both material and symbolic, in time’s incommensurable 
vectors and scales: cosmic, geological, elemental, organic, evolutionary. As Serres writes, 
“[i]nsofar as I am a memory, I participate in things. Insofar as they are things, they have 
memory” (32). The encounter with the vertigo of  deep time is thus the echo within us of  
evolutionary memory and the asubjective time of  matter, which anachronistically interrupt 
our lived experiences of  time from within. A full accounting of  the temporal sublime 
would therefore recognize the confluence of  the immemorial past and future in its cosmic, 
geological, evolutionary, and organic trajectories as a tangle of  rhythms, durations, and 
memories. This takes us well beyond an image of  time as linear or metrical; it is instead 
multiple, folded, percolating. In Serres’s words, time flows “according to an extraordinarily 
complex mixture, as though it reflected stopping points, ruptures, deep wells, chimneys of  
thunderous acceleration, rendings, gaps—all sown at random, at least in a visible disorder” 
(Serres and Latour 1995, 57). Because of  this non-linear plexity, what seems closest to us 
chronologically may in fact be distant, while often what we believe to be out-of-date is fully 
contemporary.
 Doing justice to our entanglement in a chaotic multiplicity of  durations and memories 
means breaking with the homogenous leveling of  time into substitutable and homogenous 
units, what, following Nancy, we have called its catastrophic equivalence. To break with this 
leveling of  time requires recognizing the non-equivalence of  the unique and non-substitutable 
events and moments that compose our lives, moments that cannot be exchanged precisely 
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because of  their entanglement in the plexities of  the past and future. To recognize this singularity 
of  every moment deepens our respect for the present, understood not as an immediate or 
ephemeral “now,” but rather as the time of  manifestation in which someone or something, 
always singular and incommensurable, presents itself. The singularity of  what appears in 
the non-substitutable present demands from us an attention and respect, an esteem for the 
inestimable (Nancy 2015, 39-40). Wendell Berry (2015), the leading proponent of  agrarian 
ideals in the United States, expresses what may be a parallel sentiment when he writes that: 
[w]e are always ready to set aside our present life, even our present 
happiness, to peruse the menu of  future exterminations. If  the 
future is threatened by the present, which it undoubtedly is, then the 
present is more threatened, and often is annihilated, by the future. 
(174) 
 Nancy (2017) sometimes speaks about the moment of  presence as an interruption or 
suspension of  continuity, a deferral of  time’s self-presentation, in favor of  a relationship 
that demands a gesture or a response (119-21). Yet we see that what presents itself  to us, 
what demands our esteem and our response here and now, may itself  be of  the past or of  
the future. A recovery of  the present outside the calculable general equivalence of  time 
also places us in an entirely different relationship to pasts that have created our present 
possibilities and to futures that we do not plan or project.9 Responsibility to the present 
therefore already involves us in the demands of  justice for the past and the future. How 
might we work with such an image of  time responsibly in the era of  climate change?
 For one profound example of  how such temporal justice might be enacted we can turn 
again to the work of  Whyte. In contrast with settler narratives of  “finality and last-ness,” Whyte 
(2018) describes Indigenous experiences of  “spiraling time” that maintain a continuous 
dialogue with one’s ancestors and descendants (229, emphasis in original). Whyte’s account 
situates these experiences of  time within specific Indigenous cultural contexts, yet he also 
invites non-Indigenous allies to engage in “counterfactual dialogue” and critical reflection 
on how the world that we inhabit today—that is, the world of  colonial violence as well as 
climate change—is the dream and the gift of  our settler ancestors, designed and constructed 
to “fulfill their fantasies of  the future” and to “provide privileges to their descendants” (229; 
237). Acknowledging that we are living the fantasy of  our ancestors simultaneously opens 
a dialogue with our descendants, who pose to us the question of  what kind of  ancestors we 
ourselves will be, and what kind of  world we will leave to those who follow. Counterfactual 
or fictional dialogue operates here not as an escape from our responsibilities to past and 
future, as we have seen in apocalyptic narratives, but rather as active affirmation of  a 
spiraling of  time that binds the manifestive present to the past that conditions it and the 
futures that it makes possible or forecloses. In contrast with the calculative management of  
9 On the need to break from finality itself, i.e., “from aiming, from planning, and projecting a future in 
general” and instead to work with “other futures,” see Nancy (2015, 37). On our ongoing responsibility 
to “watch out” for the future, see Nancy (2015, 64 n. 4). On the past that is constitutive of  our present 
possibilities, see Wood (2017) on “Constitutive Time” and Toadvine (2014).
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the future on the basis of  the substitutability of  homogenous times, and the linear finality 
of  a Judgment Day that liquidates both past and future, such time spiraling interrupts and 
thickens the event of  the present, in its inestimable singularity, with an anti-apocalyptic and 
anti-colonial figure of  temporal justice.
 I close with one final example of  how we might think the now in an anti-apocalyptic 
mode, in this case through the work of  art. Library of  Water is a long-term installation by 
New York-based artist Roni Horn that occupies a former municipal library in the small 
town of  Stykkishólmur on the southwest coast of  Iceland. The building is situated on a 
high rock promontory overlooking Breidafjordur bay, where its expansive windows reflect 
the meeting point of  earth, sky, and water. Horn has described this space, which hosts 
community activities as well as private contemplation, as “a lighthouse in which the viewer 
becomes the light” (Artangel 2007). The central installation, titled “Water, Selected,” 
consists of  24 floor-to-ceiling glass columns, each of  which contains water collected from 
the ice of  one of  Iceland’s major glaciers. Unsurprisingly, these glaciers are retreating at the 
fastest recorded rates, and one of  those represented in the installation—Okjökull—is now 
classified as “dead” by glaciologists due to climate disruption. The glass columns reflect and 
refract light from the windows, from each other, and from visitors as they move through 
their irregular arrangement. The floor on which they stand is embedded with words in 
Icelandic and English representing the weather. Since each glacier has a distinctive chemical 
and mineral content, no two columns are identical, and each displays a unique footprint 
of  sediments. With proper names representing the glaciers from which they were drawn, 
these columns face the visitor like clustering and dispersed figures, solitary yet interacting 
through plays of  light mediated by water and glass. As Janet Fiskio has observed, the glass 
of  each column echoes the ice of  the glaciers without any pretense of  representation or 
substitution.10 These are not the glaciers themselves, in their varying states of  precarity, but 
precisely their absence, the library and archive of  their present and future memory. They 
are the future ruins of  the Icelandic landscape and simultaneously a counter-Narcissus that 
involves the viewer in their predicament. The work thereby conveys, on the one hand, the 
excess of  the glaciers beyond any possible preservation or representation; their elemental 
duration cannot be encompassed by any human world. And, on their other hand, it reveals 
their entanglement in a history and culture that ultimately threatens their disappearance.
 Like the spiraling time that Whyte describes, Library of  Water binds our singular present 
to a non-substitutable past and future, now at a grander temporal scale. The glacial water 
remembers annual snowfalls over the course of  millennia, gradually compressed into solid 
ice by the pressure of  patient accumulation. The disappearance of  a glacier is literally the 
liquidation of  this past. The proper names of  the glaciers reflect their role in the history and 
culture of  Iceland; current rates of  glacial retreat have been compared with their historical 
extent by tracing the journeys recorded in the tenth and eleventh-century Icelandic Sagas. 
By naming the installation a library, Horn gestures to the indefinite future for which these 
10 Personal communication with the author.
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memories are preserved. Furthermore, the multilingual terms for weather embedded in the 
floor also remind us of  our temporality: Serres observes that “[t]he French language in its 
wisdom uses the same word for weather and time, le temps. At a profound level they are the 
same thing” (Serres and Latour 1995, 58). 
 My aim here has been to consider what image of  time might break with the apocalyptic 
narratives that structure our approach to climate change. This requires first coming to 
terms with the folded, nonlinear, incommensurable, and rich multiplicity of  time. As Serres 
points out, none of  the European tradition’s great thinkers of  time—Bergson, Husserl, 
Heidegger—ever completed a transatlantic flight (2018, 11). But does not the mundane 
experience of  jetlag teach us something about our corporeal entanglement in the plexities 
of  time that would be difficult to learn in any other way? Furthermore, we must break 
with the catastrophic equivalence that homogenizes the singular moments of  our lives, the 
present in which something inestimable, incalculable, presents itself  to us and demands 
our response. How are we to live in the heartbreaking present? One example is provided 
in Whyte’s account of  spiraling time. This is an example to be approached with care, since 
Whyte is not proposing a general or universal experience of  time but rather describing an 
experience and practice specific to Indigenous communities. Yet in urging non-Indigenous 
allies to take responsibility for their ancestral fantasies, Whyte suggests an obligation of  
spiraling temporal justice that extends to settlers as well at intergenerational scales. At the 
scale of  elemental time, Library of  Water expresses our predicament in the geological now by 
inviting us to register the links of  memory that bind the glacial past to the far future, and to 
work with other futures on the basis of  the inestimable present.11
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